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Expertise networks are often endowed with fragmented intellectual authority, have no formal political power to impose their choices, and lack the democratic legitimacy that governments can lay claim to. So how do these networks manage to participate in international environmental governance and impact on its development? Their influence is determined as much by the informational content of their knowledge as the process of producing it.

States and intergovernmental organisations (IGO) are still the major players in international environmental governance (IEG), but non-state bodies have progressively evolved into actors in their own right. These include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses, scientific expertise networks, indigenous and local communities. Their involvement is nothing new, but it has been on the rise in recent years.

On the global stage, these stakeholders interact through a process of ongoing exchange, combining periods of tension and phases of mutual readjustment. Their different forms of mutual communication have become key factors to help explain collective international action and its evolution. Their influence stems from their power to criticize, their capacity to mobilize, and, for some of them, their expertise.

Scientific expertise is used to provide scientifically founded answers to important political questions. Organized in transnational networks, expertise is thriving and is taking such diverse forms that it is a particularly elusive phenomenon: philanthropic foundations, scientific associations, think tanks, universities, professional associations, consulting firms, NGOs, administrations, etc. Certainly, expertise is necessary. It underpins the most important international debates, which leads to the perception that these actors have a special legitimacy and power. But, what questions does their success, even limited, raise for global environmental governance?

Environmental governance networks

During the last three decades of the 20th century, the pressures of globalization, along with other factors, have reshaped state sovereignty (See Chapter 2). We have seen a rise in the influence of transnational structures and processes in economic and political areas. These trends now have a greater impact than the State does on individuals' lives, while also empowering citizens, companies, NGOs, and other groups that participate in global politics. It is thus conceivable that a new type of global geopolitics is now being built around transnational networks, opening up expanded political arenas that transcend national boundaries and, more broadly, the State's traditional framework.

Networks at the heart of international relations. Transnational relations are by no means a new phenomenon. For centuries, direct contacts between business people, bureaucrats, aristocrats, elites, intellectuals, and revolutionaries have played a major role in the international system. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were among the first to focus on the importance of transnational networks, which they defined in 1971 as "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government."[1] A network may be construed as a weakly institutionalized social organization of individuals and groups that is structured around reciprocal exchanges and obligations.

The purpose of a network is to consolidate and further the activities of its members in one or more sociopolitical arenas.[2] In 1997, James Rosenau identified three main characteristics that differentiate networks from traditional hierarchical organizations.[3] Interdependence: cooperation between different stakeholders in a network is rooted in the idea that, alone, none of them could adequately address the issue in question; flexibility and openness: networks come in different shapes and sizes; and complementarity: networks encourage diversified membership which they use to combine and coordinate complementary resources.

As the number of networks and studies on the subject continue to grow, their exchange of knowledge, information, and expertise has become pivotal to the way in which they operate. Networks are generally classified by the political issue that they address and by the type of actors that compose them (public or private). Based on this, we could distinguish three types of networks: public, private, and hybrid. Public networks include only government actors, local government representatives, legislators, judges, and branches of intergovernmental organizations. This is the case in the field of climate[4] and the Cities for Climate Change Protection (CCP) network.

Private networks have only non-state actors, examples being the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), or voluntary agreements between industries and NGOs.

CCP is composed of 600 political representatives from over 30 countries all working to regulate their greenhouse gas emissions.
IETA is a network of 145 companies working to set up a system that allows companies to trade in greenhouse gas emissions based on market principles.
WBCSD includes 190 heads of multinationals concerned with environmental issues and who want to propose a collective response.

Lastly, in recent years we have been seeing an increase in hybrid networks, which combine private and public actors. One of the objectives of the Johannesburg Summit was to promote this type of structure, and their importance is rising. As an example, we could cite the voluntary agreement signed by the European Commission and the European, Japanese and Korean automobile manufacturers association on the CO2 emissions of new cars on the market. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a voluntary cap-and-trade system whose members include private companies, NGOs, universities, and states and local governments from North America.

Given the shifting nature of networks, the only way to really grasp their overall dynamics is to examine the spectrum of well-documented case studies in this area. The work of John Meyer and his colleagues explains the emergence of international networks of experts by using various indicators evidencing the growing global consensus that there is good reason to worry about the environment. The number of international scientific associations grew steadily between 1870 and 1990. While hardly any existed in 1870, there were already a dozen or so in 1920, close to 75 in 1970, and over 225 in 1990.[5]

The success of hybrid networks of expertise-be they weakly or highly institutionalized-directly depends on their strategic capacity to combine two interfaces: one between science and policy, and the other between the public and the private. The impacts of their actions may be considerably limited by this dual constraint. The importance that information networks have acquired falls into line with the broader trend of using science to rationalize environmental concerns, prevalent since the latter half of the 20th century.

The sustained growth of international environmental associations and international/intergovernmental scientific associations since the 1940s would seem to suggest that the same dynamic is driving the emergence of networks of experts. These have sprouted up in parallel to the increasing institutionalization of environmental issues on a global level. What then are the links between information networks and international cooperation in environmental matters?

Expertise on a grand scale. The institutionalization of networked expertise has rapidly intensified over the last three decades, and impacted on environmental issues as diverse as ozone layer depletion, air pollution in Europe, climate change, threats to biodiversity, or the effects of climate change on Arctic regions. International conventions are the largest consumers of this expertise, each developing its own way of using knowledge and integrating it into the decision-making process (See Box 1).

Most often, assessments by expert groups are summaries of scientific knowledge on a specific environmental issue that has made its way onto the political agenda. Their purpose is to give a scientific foundation to policy choices and to formulate a scientific consensus for the issue in question. The assessments are often conducted on a global scale, and sometimes the topics that they address are chosen by the political leaders themselves. They are written by teams of highly reputed experts from various disciplines, rely on existing scientific literature, and are subject to peer review. The fruits of these teams' labors are sent directly to policy-makers and sometimes to a broader audience.

The scientific and technical subsidiary bodies of conventions thus constitute important forums for communicating this institutionalized expertise to those involved. However, while these bodies were created to weigh the political implications of scientific knowledge, some have also taken on a political role. This is the case of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) which acts as an implementing body and whose composition is more political than scientific.

Some expert reports are carried out on an extensive scale and involve several hundred experts. The series of reports entitled Global Environment Outlook launched at the request of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) is one example of a program that calls for such wide-reaching expertise. It has undertaken a cross-cutting assessment that combines ambitious environmental assessments on a global and regional scale. All the data used for these studies were compiled through a network comprising regional UNEP centers, United Nations bodies, and numerous research centers.

The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) are other examples of collective work that pulls on a high number of experts. The same goes for the Scientific Panel for Assessing Ozone Depletion led by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which published the first international ozone assessments. There also exist larger scale institutionalized hybrid networks. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are emblematic examples of two that have been successful.

A new generation of environmental expertise. Since the beginning of the 21st century, new types of expertise networks have been appearing. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment is one example that follows an innovative, multithematic and multiscalar approach, setting it apart from more classic bodies like the IPCC. Launched by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2001, its assessments are coordinated by an executive committee comprising representatives of the scientific community, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and governments. Their expertise is specifically focused on the needs of various conventions: Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and Convention on Migratory Species (CMS). More than 360 experts from 96 nations have participated in the process, which was also supported by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the Global Environment Fund (GEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the IUCN, and the World Research Institute.

The MA's findings were presented as synthesis reports, making the issues studied "less complex" for political leaders. It also succeeded in drawing a line between the "known" (and widely accepted) and the "unknown" (still controversial).[6] The expert knowledge produced by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment demonstrates its capacity for adaptation and flexibility, as it was able to take on board, mid-process, new challenges such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This "open-endedness" enabled numerous experts from countries of the South to participate in the process, and created a truly interactive dynamic between the different stakeholder groups.

This expertise, however, encountered some serious limitations. Throughout the process, experts from different disciplines employed diverging and sometimes even contradictory terminology and perspectives. To counter this, a specific conceptual framework had to be crafted around the concept of "ecosystemic services," meaning the benefits that human populations derive from ecosystems. This highly anthropocentric choice of methodology was keenly criticized, because it embodied an instrumental approach explicitly geared to potential users.

Within the assessment framework, the linkage of science and policy also encountered its share of pitfalls, with the result that a good deal of information deemed indispensable by decision-makers was lacking. Critics also pointed out the one-off character of the expertise and suggested that the CBD incorporate a permanent scientific assessment body-along the lines of the IPCC for the UNFCC-with a clear mandate that would complement the SBSTA without duplicating it. This was effectively the rationale behind the launch of the Consultative Process towards an International Mechanism of Scientific Expertise on Biodiversity (IMoSEB).

The creation of IMoSEB, or its successor the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) born out of a fusion between IMoSB and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, was in part motivated by the shortcomings of the MA. In fact, the MA did not succeed in establishing itself as a fully operational hybrid network, as it did not at the outset foresee, or subsequently integrate, direct input from state actors. The Assessment thus became isolated and its policy recommendations were ignored by States, who refused to corroborate its main findings. IMoSEB and IPBES were created to forge ties with states and to form a more fluid dual interface for science-policy and public-private.

The political success of these organizations is indicative of the force fields that criss-cross hybrid networks of expertise: when government stakeholders are not involved from the outset right up to the delivery of results, the influence of such networks is greatly compromised. The future success of IPBES will surely depend on its capacity to consolidate its hybridity through bodies set up for this purpose.

Weak institutionalization. In reality, the interface between science and policy is rarely as formal as is the case during large-scale assessments. In many cases, information is incorporated into the decision-making process in a vague, unsystematic, and largely non-transparent way, as evidenced by the functioning of epistemic communities.

An epistemic community is a "network of knowledge-based experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise." Epistemic communities are "channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country." (P.M. Haas, [1992] "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, 46 [1], pp. 1-35).

The goal of these communities, whose members share a common paradigm and similar values, is to influence public policy. Specialists of atmospheric chemistry or deforestation, experts on stratospheric ozone depletion, or cetelogists try to reshape the causal and normative beliefs of decision-makers. For example, it was seemingly not a sudden change in the quality of Mediterranean waters that explained why coastal States supported the Barcelona Convention, but rather the advocacy of an ad hoc epistemic community.[7]

The more complex a situation, the more information is uncertain and ambiguous. This fact exacerbates the dilemma of political leaders and pushes them into a greater reliance on national experts, be they from universities, industries, civil society, or the administration. Epistemic communities materialize when experts exchange views on a precise question and manage to agree on a common position and solution. It is through this mechanism that epistemic communities play a role in building a shared understanding of problems and solutions in a specific area, which may be diffused on the national level, when national experts advise governments.

Epistemic communities thus have the capacity to influence political decision-making by clarifying the cause-effect relationships in play and by providing advice about the probable outcomes of different action plans. They clarify the complex interconnect­ions between the different issues and scenarize the succession of events that might result from various political decisions. They are mobilized to help States define their own interests. The fact that they help design policies by identifying the options or implications of potential decisions makes them highly influential. Epistemic communities play a "cautionary" role in the lengthy process that begins when either policy-makers or public opinion becomes aware of the gravity of a given ecological problem and the urgent need to address it, and ends with the implementation of policy decisions.

It is important to understand that epistemic communities differ fundamentally from interest groups insofar as what determines the membership of epistemic groups are shared causal beliefs and a consensus on cause-effect mechanisms, and not the inverse. Unlike interest groups, their goal is not to question the scientific knowledge they possess, but to be "knowledge brokers" who play decisive roles in the crafting of international norms. But, precisely what kind of knowledge does this involve? It is shared and consensual knowledge, not "truths" about the world. Even if one believes that epistemic communities do not give priority to specific interests, the nature of their influence remains problematic because they promote a certain world view that is rooted in specialized and therefore inevitably biased knowledge.

The inluence of knowledge in international cooperation

The attributes of policy-relevant assessments. It is hard to grasp the factors that determine when, how, and to what extent scientific knowledge influences international governance. The body of knowledge useful for decision-makers is defined as usable knowledge[8] and such information needs to have at least three key attributes if it is to directly influence the political process: salience, credibility, and legitimacy.[9]

First of all, the information must be salient. This means it must fit with the capacities and concerns of potential users. It must cover issues of interest to them and over which they have some degree of control. For instance, even an audience presumed to have an a priori interest in certain assessments might very well ignore this knowledge if it does not address a problem or its repercussions in ways that directly affects them. Data on rising sea levels, for example, might seem to have important implications for Hawaiian populations. However, the corresponding assessments have been largely ignored by the populations affected because they do not include usable information on erosion and flooding, which are the main concerns for coastal zone managers. What we see is that the salience of scientific information is not a given. This is even more evident when the information is addressed to diverse audiences. Information gains influence as its degree of its salience increases.

The influence of scientific information also depends on its credibility, or the extent to which it convinces stakeholders that the facts and scenarios proposed by scientists are "true," or at least can be used as reliable guides on how the world works. Prior to integrating scientific knowledge into their decisions, potential users check that the data they are looking at resulted from an unbiased approach. On this point, Ronald Mitchell speaks about "technical credibility."[10] Scientific information must also have "local credibility,"[11] because studies are sometimes rejected for the simple reason that they do not corroborate the actors' local experience. Zimbabwe's farmers, for instance, only saw the climate forecasts linked to the El Niño phenomenon as credible once they had been validated and supported by trusted local scientists.

Lastly, environmental problems are unquestionably linked to particularly complex bio-physical processes and to interactions with humans. No scientific assessment can claim to include all of the determining factors, consequences and possible policy solutions for resolving these problems. The variables studied in one analysis are necessarily limited in number, and are thus the product of politicized choices. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that target audiences, being aware of the selection procedures inherent to the knowledge production process, are concerned about the legitimacy of the choices made before accepting and using the findings of an assessment.

Interestingly, in many cases, measures put in place to improve one of the attributes also bolster the other two, but they can also work against them. Highly reputed scientific panels that produce information often try to maximize their credibility by calling exclusively on experts from one domain and by attempting to isolate the expert process from any outside political influence perceived to be damaging. In practice, however, the influence of such an approach will inevitably be very limited, since the questions that are the most relevant for policy-makers will be systematically eliminated. The opposite can also occur when pressure from policy-makers or the public lead experts to publish their results prematurely, which detracts from their credibility.

Networks working for environmental governance. We have seen how information produced and provided by networks of expertise impacts on sociopolitical dynamics. In what ways then can this influence be beneficial to international environmental governance?

The information these networks diffuse can help generate a common understanding of environmental problems. The work of Peter Haas[12] outlines the prerequisites for information intended for environmental governance.

The effectiveness of international environmental governance can be measured by States' ratification of international agreements, the implementation of national policies, or solving an environmental problem. This is the approach used here in spite of presenting some analytical pitfalls.

These are rooted in the three main functions of expertise networks: basic knowledge, environmental monitoring, and policy advice.

Basic knowledge involves improving the understanding of natural transnational and global dynamics. It supplies useful information for political decision-makers about environmental impacts on the national and subnational level. In this sense, improving basic knowledge can help to define priority actions, get them onto political agendas, give early warnings, and facilitate policy choices for solutions.

Environmental monitoring refers to the systematic collection of information on a given issue. Environmental monitoring and effective assessment are a condition for collective learning and can glean key information for actors specialized in mobilizing public opinion.

Lastly, policy advice formulated on the basis of scientific information indicates which political initiatives should be taken in order to modify collective behavior. This advice is likely to influence the substance of national and international environmental policies, as well as the conformity and effectiveness of regulatory regimes.

In this sense, an approach rooted in epistemic communities opens up new avenues to understanding the role that knowledge plays in international cooperation. It is thus very important to question the soundness of the scientific foundations guiding political decision-making, given the difficulty of evaluating the assumed influence of epistemic communities, and more generally of science and scientists.

Certainly, it is still a difficult task to elucidate the role epistemic communities play in international cooperation. First of all, what defines an epistemic community? The composition of these networks is highly variable. For instance, these communities include individuals claiming to posses a specific expertise, but sometimes include national or international bureaucracies favorable to their ideas. Some epistemic communities are vested (or not) with power by the governments that are seeking information and advice from them in the face of uncertainty. Lastly, an epistemic community can exist on a transnational level, whilst on the national level scientific cohesion is lacking, with separate "advocacy groups" often competing against each other.

The empirical viability of an approach that relies solely on epistemic communities should be viewed with caution. Why then study epistemic communities rooted in knowledge rather than NGOs or transnational advocacy groups that are value-based? In his study on the respective influence of NGOs and the scientific community in policy-making on Antarctica in 1998,[13] Philip Howard claims that it is more useful to study epistemic communities to explain the management of the global commons. The case studies on the Black Sea and Caspian Sea suggest that, while these communities play diverse and important roles (including that of advisors), they do not explain why cooperation was possible in the first case and more problematic in the second. In fact, a rational explanatory model that simply tallies up the expected economic benefits appears to explain why the coastal States decided to sign the regional agreement on the Caspian Sea.

An approach based on epistemic communities relies heavily on the existence of a common paradigm. This tends to posit that science is above politics and that knowledge can be separated from politics. Yet, these communities are also political actors because they lay claim to a particular authority grounded in expertise and, like other advocacy groups, they too have their own interests.

Although the role of scientific communities remains open to debate, this does not mean we should neglect the value of ideas or cognitive and cultural factors that make up the concept of "world view." Karen Litfin,[14] for instance, stresses the importance of discourse, ideas and knowledge, as well as a common understanding about the constructed definition of a problem. In fact, two types of beliefs play a role here, with their relative importance being mediated by a political context that invests them with meaning: beliefs about cause-effect relationships (characteristic of scientific expertise) and those involving normative convictions, such as the precautionary principle.

The authority and objectivity of science in question. The limits to the study of epistemic communities call for a broader questioning of the role of knowledge in international political cooperation. The sociology of science and technology has challenged the "objective" nature of scientific knowledge, considering it rather as a social construct. There are three main objections that call the authority of science into question.[15]

Scientific consensus is often perceived as suspect because the argumentative basis of science itself is part of a discourse that is not culturally neutral. In international relations, the origin of knowledge is just as important as, if not more important than its actual substance. Relying on science for international policy design introduces mediation processes that open the door to possible use of this knowledge to further the political objectives of its users. Science is political because some stand to gain from it, while others may suffer from the consequences of new knowledge. Certainly, political choices justified by scientific knowledge influence the power balance between stakeholders. Moreover, whenever the groups actually affected by the use of scientific knowledge in policy decisions have not been consulted on its construction and application, the use and the very nature of science often becomes illegitimate.

Modern science is part of the system of international inequalities and it is understandable that scientific inequalities between North and South play a major role in international environmental governance insofar as the negotiation capacity of some States depends heavily on their access to scientific data and arguments. For lack of expertise both from and in the South, international epistemic communities sometimes inadequately represent the interests of developing countries. It is thus easy to understand how numerous countries in the South are unable to fully participate in international negotiations and debates. This was the case during the discussions on protecting the ozone layer, a topic about which only industrialized countries had specialized knowledge because it was they who carried out research on their respective territories. The relatively weak capatity of many countries to carry out their own assessments of the environmental risks that they inevitably face is another aspect of this inequality.

It is generally assumed that knowledge acquisition assists decision-makers in their policy choices. The logic is the following: the more vast and in-depth the scientific knowledge, the better the understanding of environmental mechanisms, the easier it is to design informed policy with broad-based consensus, and the higher the chances of success. However, knowledge does not always help resolve environmental problems. In reality, the growth of knowledge does not de facto alleviate the uncertainty of decision-makers. Indeed, this knowledge can even sometimes complicate cooperation processes, as it only creates greater uncertainty about the world. As we continue to pierce the mysteries of natural bio-physical cycles, new questions are constantly arising, and this shifts uncertainty to other areas. In some cases, although knowledge is accumulating, choices are seemingly harder and harder to make, as a host of potential contradictions between different solutions to environmental issues become more visible. It is even possible that scientific knowledge becomes a stumbling block to the political resolution of environmental conflicts. If, for instance, the origin and spread of certain pollutants were made known, then the willingness of all concerned parties to bear the cost of regulating them would drastically dwindle. Why, indeed, should the victims agree to pay anything? Paradoxically, the presence of a scientific "veil of uncertainty" as to the consequences of environmental change may thus facilitate cooperation. A case in point is the merging of national data on telluric pollution in the Mediterranean Action Plan by technical experts in order to obfuscate the responsibility of individual stakeholders, and so as to avoid finger-pointing certain Mediterranean countries as heavy polluters. There are also extreme, but frequent, cases where knowledge production offers a way of circumventing blockages: it can be used as a pretext for delaying decisions or for adopting measures. In this case, calling on science is a way of supporting environmental inaction.

Summary and outlook 

It is impossible to understand the dynamics behind international relations in the fields of economics, the environment, or human rights without first understanding the types of roles that expertise networks play. Policy-making relies heavily on these networks, and this is especially true in industrial countries. In the environment arena, identifying problems, moving them onto political agendas, adopting new concepts (like ecosystemic services), and assessing and developing policies have largely been the fruit of actions of networks of scientific expertise.

Yet, the influence of scientific knowledge should not be overestimated. Over the last twenty years or so, diverse studies have helped better define the changing processes and the limits of scientific influence. The way in which this knowledge permeates the political game is indeed one key variable, but the information production process counts just as much as, if not more than the actual informational content. Understanding the importance of knowledge thus means examining the production process, from the initial phase of problem definition up to the diffusion of new knowledge to the intended audience and its integration into political decision-making. Expertise networks cannot be dissociated from power games because they help institutionalize mainstream views, because the information produced and diffused impacts resource distribution, or because they are instrumentalized by States. Although expertise was initially defined by the yardstick of consecrated and durably documented scientific knowledge, it must now be reviewed in light of the process used to produce this knowledge.

Box 1 | Integrating expertise into the Convention of Biological Diversity

Like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), scientific contributions were channeled and integrated into the political process by an institution linked to the Convention of Biological Diversity: the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice (SBSTTA). This is responsible for providing the scientific assessments needed for the Convention. The scientific information is produced through several processes, which are most often combined, though sometimes separate. The ad hoc groups of technical experts performing the scientific assessments do so with a specific goal in mind. Based on published literature, recent workshops and meetings, and sometimes with the help of outside consultants, the secretariat prepares synthesis reports. Other organizations, particularly the UN's specialized agencies and international non-governmental organizations, are brought in to help write the reports.

Box 2 | International Union for Conservation of Nature

The International Union for Conservation of Nature (formerly International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) was founded in 1948. It atypically gathers governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from 160 countries. It currently includes over 1,000 members (200 governmental and 800 non-governmental) who collaborate with 11,000 volunteer scientists. The IUCN is based in Switzerland, but its secretariat and activities have been increasingly decentralized across some forty regional and national offices. IUCN's mission is to "influence, en‑courage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that the use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable." IUCN has played a crucial role in developing national laws and policy on natural resource conservation, in monitoring international agreements, in designing and implementing technical conservation projects in countries of the South, and in raising public awareness about the rapid deterioration of ecosystems and the threat of extinction to certain species of wild fauna and flora. Its political influence is remarkable. It initiated the 1982 World Charter for Nature and also had a role in promoting and drawing up the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. IUCN collaborates closely with UN institutions: it administers UNEP, WWF, and the World Conservation Monitoring Center (WCMC). It has also collaborated with the Bonn Convention on the Conversation of Migratory Species.


1. Keohane (R.) et Nye (J.), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1970.

2. Smouts (M.-C.), Battistella (D.) et Vennesson (P.), Dictionnaire des relations internationales. Paris, Dalloz, 2003.

3. Rosenau (J. N.), Along the Domestic-foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

4. Andonova (L.), Betsill (M.) et Bulkeley (H.), " Transnational Climate Change Governance ", communication, Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Amsterdam, 24-26 mai 2007.

5. Meyer (J. W.), Frank (D. J.), Hironaka (A.), Schofer (E.) et Tuma (N. B.), " The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870-1990 ", International Organization, 51 (4), 1997, p. 623-651.

6. Leemans (R.), " Personal Experiences with the Governance of the Policy-relevant IPCC and Millennium Ecosystem Assessments ", Global Environmental Change, 18, 2008, p. 12-17.

7. HAAS (P. M.), Saving the Mediterranean : The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, New York (N. Y.), Columbia University Press, 1990.

8. Dimitrov (R. S.), " Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation ", International Studies Quarterly, 47, 2003, p. 123-150.

9. Mitchell (R. B.), Clark (W. C.) et Cash (D. W.), " Information and Influence ", dans R. B. Mitchell, W. C. Clark, D. W. Cash et N. M. Dickson, Global Environmental Assessments. Information and Influence, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 2006, p. 307-335.

10. Ibid.

11. Jasanoff (S.) et Martello (M. L.), Globalization Seen through the Lens of Environmental Governance. Analyses of How the Global and Local Can Accommodate One Another, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 2004.

12. Haas (P. M.), " Science Policy for Multilateral Environmental Governance ", dans N. Kanie et P. M. Haas (eds), Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance, Tokyo, United Nations University, 2004, p. 115-136.

13. HOWARD (P.), " Institutional Change in International Environmental Regime : The Case of the Antarctic Treaty System ", communication, Congrès de l'International Studies Association, Chicago, 1998.

14. LITFIN (K. T.), Ozone Discourses : Sciences and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation, New York (N. Y.), Columbia University Press, 1994.

15. Jasanoff (S.), Markle (G. E.), Petersen (L. C.) et Pinch (T.) (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Thousands Oaks (Calif.), Sage, 1995.